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The World’s Complex Crisis Landscapes 
 
The 1989 turning point in world history resulted from a domino effect that within weeks led to 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Eastern Block and a breakdown of the East-West 
conflict. After the Cold War, the relationship between the former superpowers changed from 
hostility to cooperation but was challenged from the beginning by the Western dominance and 
the rivalry with Russia, China and other powers. A new world of disorder and transformation 
emerged in which multiple crises interacted in fractal and fragile landscapes at national, 
subnational and transnational levels that continue to be unstable and full of surprises (Scheffran 
2008). Conflicts in the Balkans, in Africa, the Middle East and other parts of the world triggered 
foreign military interventions. Nuclear and missile proliferation continued, and new arms races 
emerged including outer space and new technologies that accelerated a ‘revolution in military 
affairs.’ ‘New wars’ and terrorism demonstrated that individuals and small groups can have huge 
impacts and contribute to the cycles of hatred and violence. 
The “complexity turn” in international relations (Urry 2005) is characterized by multi-
level crises interrelated through global connectors such as financial markets, infrastructures and 
supply chains; media and social networks; communication and transportation systems; resource 
flows and climate change (Figure 1).  
While complex systems are often robust against disturbances, on the edge of instability 
small variations and uncertainties can make big differences between systemic breakdown or 
creation of new ones. When everything is interconnected, changes in one part of the world could 
have significant impacts elsewhere, triggering cascading crises beyond tipping points (Kominek 
and Scheffran 2012; Scheffran 2015), including natural disasters, stock market crashes, 
revolutions, mass exodus or violent conflicts.  
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Figure 1: Global connectors in complex crises landscapes 
 
Source: Scheffran (modified from author’s presentation, ISA Atlanta, March 2016) 
 
In the world’s fractal and fragile landscapes, crisis events include: September 11; the global and 
Greek economic crisis; the Arab Spring; wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria; the civil war 
in Ukraine; the European refugee crisis and terror attacks in many countries; nationalist 
movements; the British Brexit and consequences of the US election (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Interconnected conflicts and crisis landscapes since 1989 
 
Source: Scheffran (modified from author’s presentation, ISA Atlanta, March 2016) 
	 3 
Climate Change as a Risk Multiplier 
 
Environmental change is connected with other problem areas through multiple linkages from 
local to global levels. Climate change is becoming a risk multiplier which imposes stress on 
natural resources such as water, food and energy, and threatens the functioning of critical 
infrastructures and supply networks for health and wealth, provoking production losses, price 
increases and financial crises. In the most affected regional hot spots, global climate change and 
local environmental degradation can contribute to poverty and hunger, undermine human 
security, social living conditions and political stability; and aggravate migration movements and 
conflict situations (Scheffran et al. 2012). Particularly critical is the situation in fragile and 
failing states with social fragmentation, inadequate governance and management capacities. The 
impact of environmental change could weaken the ability to solve problems and dissolve state 
structures. Whether climate stress triggers cycles of risk and violence or rather favors a transition 
towards cooperation, resilience and sustainability depends on human and societal responses. The 
challenges of neighboring crisis landscapes for European stability, transformation and 
governance are discussed in the following, with focus on the Mediterranean and Arctic regions. 
 
The Mediterranean Region 
 
The Mediterranean region, including Southern Europe as well the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), is forming complex crisis landscapes. Various socio-political, economic and ecological 
processes are interconnected, including differences between the Islamic, Christian and Jewish 
religions; the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict; political instability in the Arab Spring and armed 
conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen; aspirations for regional hegemony by Iran, Saudi-Arabia 
and Turkey; terror and violent acts by the “Islamic State” or other non-state actors; mass 
migration and refugees movements; interventions by external powers such as Russia, the USA 
and NATO; and divisions between Global North and South. 
In addition, global warming poses challenges for the Mediterranean. Variations in 
temperature, precipitation, weather extremes and sea-level affect soil erosion, desertification, 
river flows, coastal zones, rural and urban areas. Particularly vulnerable are agriculture, forestry, 
fishery and the water-food-energy nexus. Heat waves and forest fires compromise vegetation, 
ecosystem change affect soil quality, carbon cycle and local climate. The shrinking resource base 
undermines living standards and development opportunities, and conflicts with rising demands 
by growing population, economic consumption and water-intensive activities such as irrigation.  
 Combined with other factors, such as unemployment, poverty, economic recession and 
unstable political regimes, climate change can  contribute to instability of the Mediterranean 
region through mass migration, riots and violent clashes. Whether these developments occur 
depends on the differences in vulnerability, and adaptive and problem-solving capacities across 
the Mediterranean (Scheffran and Brauch 2014). In Southern Europe, declining water and land 
availability could endanger human livelihood and tourism. Relatively high economic and social 
capabilities can be supported by the EU to mitigate impacts and strengthen long-term adaptation 
to minimize outbreaks of violence and conflict. In MENA, climate change interacts with the 
region’s other challenges such as population growth, dependence on agriculture and weak 
governance. Compared to Europe, MENA countries are more vulnerable, less able to adapt and 
mitigate conflict (Schilling et al. 2012). 
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For instance, Egypt and especially the capital Cairo are highly vulnerable to various 
impacts of climate change, like water scarcity, land degradation and loss in agricultural 
productivity. Demographic pressures of a doubling population may intensify land and water 
competition. Since Egypt depends on the Nile for 95 percent of its water, increasing water 
demand by upstream countries and sea-level rise in the Nile delta bears a conflict potential (Link 
et al. 2012), but also the need for agreements to regulate water distribution in the Nile basin 
(Link et al. 2013).  
Widely discussed are the social and political upheavals in the Arab Spring since 2011. 
The series of protests and uprisings, from Tunisia to Libya, Egypt, Syria and other MENA 
countries were accelerated and multiplied by electronic media and social networks (Kominek and 
Scheffran 2012). The role of rising food prices and climate change is subject to scientific 
debates. Some studies argued that the political crisis was aggravated by weather events, in 
particular the 2010/2011 drought in China, which affected the international market price of 
wheat and food availability (Werrell and Femia 2013), together with other drivers of food prices, 
including oil price, bioenergy use and stock market speculations. The consequences of low 
income, resource imports and high food spending contributed to political unrest. This illustrates 
how in an interconnected world a complex chain of events and overlapping stressors can affect 
international stability.   
In the years before the rebellion, Syria suffered devastating droughts (Kelley et al. 2015) 
hitting the main growing areas, driving people from rural to urban areas and reducing the number 
of people in agriculture by half (Werz and Hoffman 2013). This added to other conflict drivers 
rooted in economic, social and demographic conditions, political failures of and dissatisfaction 
with Assad as well as the US invasion in Iraq 2003, the Arab Spring of 2011 and the emergence 
of the Islamic State (for a critical view see Fröhlich 2016). While the Syrian civil war became the 
battleground of regional and external powers and destabilized the region, millions were driven as 
refugees into neighboring countries and abroad. This merged with other migration movements 
through MENA, from Afghanistan and Iraq to the Sahel, related to violent conflict, population 
growth, rural-urban mobility, resource depletion and climate change. 
When these movements reached Europe across the Mediterranean Sea and the Balkan 
route in 2015, the European Union was unable to jointly handle this situation. In the emerging 
“refugee crisis,” nationalist movements provoked tensions. Media coverage of boat people and 
refugees reinforced threat perceptions and the securitization of migration, e.g. through 
FRONTEX which expanded the ‘defence’ of and against refugees. These developments framed 
the debate on environmental and climate migration in wake of the 2015 Paris Agreement on 
climate change.  
The Mediterranean region suffers from a lack of cooperation, where a number of 
dialogues coexist with little interaction, at the Euromed, NATO and OSCE levels (Scheffran and 
Brauch 2014). The new challenges need to be addressed in a multilateral and cooperative way, 
including policies and institutions on climate impacts, adaptation and mitigation, in particular in 
energy security based on renewables. A Mediterranean and Human Security Initiative (MEH-
SEC) would allow a balanced economic co-development across the Mediterranean. 
 
The Arctic Region 
 
The Arctic is in a process of substantial transformation, creating new challenges for the EU. It is 
one of the world’s regions most affected by global warming, including sea ice melting and 
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permafrost, changing ocean currents, increasing albedo and release of greenhouse gases, possibly 
triggering tipping points in the global climate system. On a local scale, there are significant 
impacts on soils and vegetation; ecosystems and biodiversity; human livelihood and access to 
natural resources. Climate change combines with a shifting political climate between Russia and 
the West as well as instabilities in the EU and the transformation of transatlantic relationships 
with the Trump administration. The warming opens new conditions for shipping, food and 
energy production in a yet unexplored and unexploited polar region. Security risks and conflict 
potentials are raised by the exploitation of fossil reserves, competing claims for transportation, 
pipelines and national borders, protests by indigenous people and civil society, and the struggle 
on global climate policy. The availability of natural resources and expected gains in the Arctic 
could induce legal disputes and resource competition.  
The complex linkages between global and local issues in the Arctic region challenge the 
balance of power between USA, Canada, Europe, Russia, China and Japan in the Northern 
hemisphere. Although Arctic military forces are yet quite small, political escalations can 
contribute to new arms races between nuclear weapons, missiles and submarines combined with 
space, cyber and hybrid warfare. On the other hand, opportunities for increased cooperation and 
new partnerships can arise between private and state actors. Transboundary cooperative alliances 
for a more sustainable and secure development require regulating policies, institutions and 
management approaches to ensure a secure and sustainable transition into a new era of Arctic 
development. 
 
Governing Complexity and Risk 
 
In the complex nexus of interconnected crises, the world may continue on a slippery slope of 
escalation, running into natural boundaries and their forces. The growing complexity provokes 
countering trends of over-simplifications, religious, populist and nationalist fundamentalisms, 
rhetoric against science and intellectuals, and resistance against globalization. Whether 
simplicity will trump complexity is doubtful, as overly simple responses may lead to further 
destabilization. Stability may be rather achieved by adapting the complexity of policies to the 
complexity of the systemic processes which they regulate. The challenge is to anticipate and 
avoid risky pathways by counteracting forces that slow down and change course towards a more 
sustainable, peaceful and viable world, based on integrative and interdisciplinary knowledge 
which avoids dangerous pathways and interventions and takes the limits of the Anthropocene 
into account (Scheffran 2016). Concepts of anticipative and adaptive governance are needed to 
influence critical decision points and develop collective adaptive strategies, moving the planet 
through the complex and foggy landscapes of the future. 
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